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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARINDA DAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10256 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of 
an automobile collision that occurred on September 11, 1961, 
on U. S. 91, 4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah, in which the 
plaintiff suffered injuries to her back, requiring two opera-
tions. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury. The court submitted 
a special verdict to the jury in the form of five questions 
and upon the basis of answers given to the special verdict, 
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the court ordered the clerk to enter judgment, no cause of 
action, which was done accordingly. Plaintiff made motion 
for judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative for a new trial 
which was denied, from which plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in 
the court below and for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant will be hereafter referred to as 
plaintiff and defendant-respondent will hereafter be re-
f erred to as defendant. 
On the morning of September 11, 1961, two vehicles 
approached an aocident scene from opposite directions on 
U. S. 91, 4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah. A Utah highway 
patrolman, Eldon Sherwood, was at the accident scene 
completing his investigation (R. 176). The accident in-
volved a rollover of a foreign car that came to rest on the 
west shoulder of the highway, a few feet onto the hard 
surface (R. 344, Exh. P-2 and D-4). The weather was 
clear (R. 138) and the road was a two lane asphalt high-
way (R. 139). 
Plaintiff Marinda Day, a 47 year old housewife, (R. 
231) was a passenger in the vehicle proceeding north (R. 
216, 231). It was a 1949 Chevrolet pick-up truck driven 
by a friend, Larry Roberts, age 16, (R. 214) and owned by 
Ted Davis (R. 181, 215). Plaintiff was on her way to 
Provo to pick up some glasses and Larry offered to give 
s 
her a ride (R. 215, 230). The Robert's truck was followed 
by a sheriff's car driven by Juab County Sheriff Ray Jack-
son (R. 139). 
The other vehicle proceeding south was a 1961 Corvair 
box truck (red Greenbriar) owned by defendant corpora-
tion, Lorenzo Smith & Son (R. 181) and driven by an em-
ployee, Joseph Ivy Mitchell (R. 143). Defendant, in its an-
swer to the complaint, admitted agency of its employee 
(R. 4). Mr. Mitchell has since died from causes not as-
sociated with this accident. 
The two vehicles came upon the accident scene and 
sideswiped each other (R. 224). After impact, the Robert's 
truck careened some distance down the right or east side 
of the highway, turned sideways and skidded, and then 
rolled one complete turn and came to rest 310 .feet north 
of the collision on the east shoulder (R. 177, 178). Defen-
dant's vehicle travelled south approximately 150 feet and 
pulled off on the right hand side of the road (R. 178). The 
ultimate question for the jury was which vehicle was in 
the wrong lane of traffic at the time of impact. 
Patrolman Sherwood found plaintiff lying on her back 
on the pavement near the Robert's truck complaining of 
severe pain (R. 178). She suffered back and neck injuries 
and subsequently had two operations fusing vertabrae in 
her lower back (R. 277) and neck (R. 284) with perma-
nent disability (R. 290). 
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in (a) 
failing to maintain a proper lookout, and in (b) driving 
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left of the center of the highway into the path of the ve-
hide in which plaintiff was riding (R. 41, 42). Six eye. 
witnesses to the accident appeared at the trial. Four of 
these witnesses testified the impact occurred in the east 
lane (plaintiff's side) of the highway: Desmond Naismith 
(R. 194), Larry Roberts (R. 218), Marinda Day (R. 232) 
and Marion Brown (R. 322), a telephone company em-
ployee who was standing by the Naismith car at the time 
of the accident. Another witness, Helen Naismith, saw 
defendant's vehicle drive over on the white line shortly be-
fore impact, but did not see the collision (R. 212). Defen-
dant produced two witnesses who testified the impact oc-
curred in the west lane (defendant's side) of the highway: 
Henry Kelly (R. 339) and his son Robert (R. 384). The 
special verdict submitted to the jury was answered as fol-
lows: 
Question No. 1: Was Joseph Ivy Mitchell negligent 
in one or more of the particulars claimed by Mrs. 
Day, viz., 
(a) By failing to keep a proper lookout for other 
vehicles upon the highway (R. 41)? 
Answer: Yes. 
Signed by 6 jurors. 
(b) By driving to the left of the center of the high-
way? 
Answer: No preponderance. 
Signed by 6 jurors. 
Question No. 2 : If you answered "Yes" to either 
(a) or (b) above, do you further find that su.ch 
negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained by Mrs. Day? 
Answer to (a) above No. 
Signed by 6 jurors. 
Answer to ( b) above ............ (No answer) 
Signed by no jurors. 
Question No. 3 : Was Mrs. Day negligent as claimed 
by Lorenzo Smith and Son in failing to advise her 
driver to slow down immediately prior to the col-
lision (R. 42) ? 
Answer: No she was not negligent. 
Signed by 8 jurors. 
Question No. 4 : If you found negligence in Ques-
tion No. 3, was it a proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained by Mrs. Day? 
Answer: No. 
No jurors signed. 
Question No. 5: (a) As shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence in this case, what amount of money 
would fairly and adequately recompense Mrs. Day 
for any and all pain and suffering and loss of bod-
ily function which was occasioned to her as a result 
of injuries which she received from the collision in 
question? 
Answer: $60,000.00. 
Signed by 8 jurors. 
(b) (1) Has Mrs. Day sustained any loss of earn-
ing capacity as a result of the injuries she received 
in the collision? 
Answer: Yes. 
(2) If so, what has been the diminution in her 
income per year? 
Answer: $450.00. 
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(3) For how many years will the diminution 
continue (R. 43)? 
Answer: 5 years. 
Signed by 8 jurors. 
Special damages were stipulated by counsel in 
the sum of $3,125.20. 
The court thereupon entered judgment in favor of the 
defendant, no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
HIGHWAY PATROLMAN TO GIVE HIS OPIN-
ION AS TO THE POINT OF IMPACT. 
Investigation by counsel before trial revealed that the 
two police officers had developed varied and conflicting 
opinions as to which side of the highway the impact oc-
curred. However, these opinions were not based upon an 
examination of the physical evidence at the scene (R. 145, 
181). Sheriff Jackson was of the opinion that the accident 
occurred in the east portion of the highway while patrol· 
man Sherwood judged that it occurred in the west portion. 
Whether these opinions would be admissible at the trial 
was a crucial question since the subject was the pivotal 
issue of the case and the opinion of a police officer OC(!UPY· 
ing an official position would greatly impress the jury. 
Plaintiff elected to call Sheriff Jackson as her first 
witness. He testified that the point of impact could not 
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be determined from an investigation of the physical evi-
dence at the scene of the accident. 
"Q. Were you able to determine the point of 
collision that these cars had?" 
"A. No." 
"Q. Why not?" 
"A. There was no marks on the highway 
other than the debris, which covered a large area. 
Now, this debris was glass and dirt, and there was 
no point that I - we could determine or I could de-
termine where the point of impact were and where 
one car was in relationship to the other car. The 
first marks laid down by any vehicle was the Rob-
ert's car after it left the scene, and if you don't 
mind, I will show you where they started." 
"Q. Please do" (R. 145). 
"A. The marks of the Robert's car extended 
from its position down into about this area, some-
thing like that, and these were the only marks that 
you could find indicating where the impact oc-
curred. Could not tie it down." 
"Q. And on which lane of the highway were 
those marks?" 
"A. On the right-hand side facing north, or 
on the extreme - on the east side of the highway." 
"Q. Did those marks extend to any - from 
any point over on to the west side of the highway?" 
"A. No they did not" (R. 146). 
Sheriff Jackson testified that he examined the marks 
on the highway in the company of highway patrolman 
Sherwood and the patrolman could not find a point of im-
pact from an investigation of the physical evidence. 
"A. And officer Sherwood requested them to 
take some pictures because I always carry cameras, 
and I said, 'Yes, come down and show me where the 
point of impact is'; and he says, 'You can't find the 
point of impact'; and he walked down with me, and 
then he pointed out these - or the skid marks. This 
is the oil, and this is this - caused in the first ac-
cident by this Volkswagen, and I think the people 
were from Canada, and they had tripped over going 
down the road, and then he pointed out to me that 
the glass and dust and debris, this came from the 
second accident, and we both examined the highway 
very carefully together, and we both agreed I 
thought at the point - at least I agreed that I could 
not tie that point of impact down to any one par· 
ticular segment of the highway, and then I went 
back and shot the photographs that are here" (R. 
153). 
Then, on direct examination, Sheriff Jackson volun-
teered an opinion based upon the marks he found on the 
east side of the highway and the Court excluded this testi-
mony upon objection by defendant's counsel. 
"Q. All right. Now, I believe you indicated 
that there were marks on the highway running 
from the Robert's vehicle." 
"A. That's right." 
"Q. And all of these marks were on the east 
side of the highway" (R. 155)? 
"A. That's right. This vehicle - from the 
marks I would be of the opinion that the vehicle -" 
"MR. NEBEKER: I object your Honor, to any 
opinion given by the officer." 
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"THE COURT: Yes." 
"MR. NEBEKER: I think he ought to confine 
himself to what he saw." 
"THE COURT: Just tell what you saw." 
"MR. BEESLEY: Certainly." 
"A. I saw the marks leading directly from the 
Robert's car back along the highway to the south 
for quite some distance, and they were quite wide 
apart, wider than would be made by the normal, oh, 
skidding of a car going down the highway straight, 
and then they ceased. All these marks were on the 
east side of the highway" (R. 156) . 
Plaintiff then called patrolman Sherwood. In so doing, 
plaintiff vouched for the patrolman's credibility when she 
put him on the stand, but she had the right to assume that 
he would not be permitted to give improper testimony, 
Chester v. Shockley (1957 Mo.) 304 S. W. 2d 831, especial-
ly in view of the court's previous ruling excluding the opin-
ion of sheriff Jackson. Patrolman Sherwood testified that 
he did not see the collision. 
"A. The noise was more to my rear and to my 
right, so I just turned to the right and saw this 
Davies (Roberts) vehicle taking off down the pave-
ment on the right or east side of the highway, (R. 
177) and it traveled some distance, and then it 
turned sideways and skidded and then rolled one 
complete turn." 
"Q. I see. You didn't then see the collision?" 
"A. No" (R. 178). 
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Patrolman Sherwood found no skidmarks by either 
vehicle prior to the impact and the Robert's vehicle was 
the only car to leave any marks on the road after impact 
(R. 179). Patrolman Sherwood corroborated the testimony 
of Sheriff Jackson that there was no objective evidence 
whatsoever to determine the point of impact. 
"Q. I see. Now, were there any objective 
signs whatsoever to determine the point of colli-
sion?" 
"A. No." 
"MR. NEBEKER: I will object to that, Your 
Honor. I think he can state what he saw and let 
the jury decide." 
"THE COURT: Well, since he says no, I guess 
we don't have to pursue it further." 
"MR. BEESLEY: I don't intend to, Your Hon-
or" (R. 181). 
Then, on cross examination, counsel for defendant 
elicited from the patrolman the improper testimony com-
plained of in this appeal. The patrolman was asked his 
opinion as to the point of impact. The court had previously 
excluded sheriff Jackson's opinion but now chose to admit 
testimony of that same nature from patrolman Sherwood 
by distinguishing between the terms "opinion" evidence 
and "judgment" evidence. 
"Q. From your examination of the road, you 
made a determination as to the approximate point 
of impact, did you not?" 
"A. Yes." 
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"Q. Was that point of impact on the east or 
the west side of (R. 182) the road?" 
"A. It was near the center line, and my best 
opinion, it may have been -" 
"MR. BEESLEY: I will object to any opinion, 
Your Honor." 
"THE COURT: Well, you may give your judg-
ment. If you are giving us an opinion, he would be 
right. If you mean by your opinion your best judg-
ment as to what you judge it would be, I think you 
might proceed, Sergeant, and I don't quite know -" 
"Q. Give us your judgment." 
"MR. BEESLEY: Make the same objection, 
Your Honor." 
"THE COURT: Let's find out if he has a judg-
ment or giving an opinion. If he is giving an opin-
ion, he can't." 
"Q. Do you have a judgment as to where the 
point of impact occurred?" 
"A. Yes." 
"Q. Will you tell us what the judgment is?" 
"MR. BEESLEY: Objection, Your Honor." 
"THE COURT: It's overruled. He may give 
his judgment." 
"A. As near the center line and probably a 
little bit west." 
"MR. BEESLEY: I object to any probability, 
Your Honor." 
"THE COURT: If you are confining it to your 
judgment -" 
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"Q. Just give us your best judgment." 
"THE COURT: You can tell us your judg. 
ment." 
"MR. BEESLEY: I believe he said the center 
line." 
"A. Near the center line" (R. 183). 
"Q. Was it on the west or the east of the 
center line?" 
"A. Do I have to answer that 'yes' or 'no'?" 
"Q. Yes." 
"A. My opinion is no good?" 
"Q. Just give us your judgment." 
"THE COURT: You can give us your judg-
ment, Sergeant." 
"A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the 
center line." 
"Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the 
west of the center line?" 
"A. I think that would be a fair figure." 
"Q. It could have been a little .further west? 
It could have been a little further east?" 
"A. Yes" (R. 184). 
Plaintiff submits that a distinction between the two 
terms "opinion" and "judgment" was indistinguishable to 
counsel, the witness, or to members of the jury. In 29 
Words and Phrases 595, these two terms are held to be 
synonymous. 
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"Best judgment means substantially the same 
thing as opinion or belief." Harris v. State, (Tex.) 
137 s. w. 373, 376. 
More often than otherwise, the question of the admissi-
bility of expert opinion evidence in an action for damages 
arising out of highway accidents has involved testimony 
by highway patrolmen, sheriffs, deputies, police officers or 
other public officials who viewed the facts and circum-
stances at the scene after the accident occurred and gave 
their opinion as to what happened. The courts are sharply 
divided numerically and otherwise respecting the admissi-
bility of evidence of this kind. See notes to Tuck v. Buller 
( 1957 Okla.) , 66 A. L. R. 2d 1043. Cases supplementing 
this 1958 annotation indicate a trend to exclude such opin-
ions. Counsel for plaintiff is unaware of any Utah cases 
directly considering the question. 
This point presents four basis issues for consideration: 
(1) Is the point of impact a proper subject matter for ex-
pert opinion evidence by a highway patrolman? (2) As-
suming point of impact is a proper subject matter for ex-
pert opinion evidence, is such an opinion admissible when 
based upon some source other than competent facts? (3) 
Assuming point of impact is a proper subject matter for 
expert opinion evidence, was it error for the court to admit 
in evidence the opinion of patrolman Sherwood after ex-
cluding the opinion of sheriff Jackson? (4) If the admis-
sion of the highway patrolman's opinion was error, was 
such error prejudicial? 
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(1) Is the point of impact a proper subject matter 
for expert opinion evidence by a highway patrolman? 
It is a fundamental principle of the law of evidence as 
administered by our courts, that testimony at a trial upon 
matters within the scope of the common knowledge and 
experience of mankind must generally be confined to state-
ments of concrete facts within the observation, knowledge, 
and recollection of the witness as distinguished from their 
opinions, impressions, judgments or conclusions drawn 
from such facts. However, when the jury is confronted 
with issues, the proper understanding of which requires 
specialized knowledge or experience and which cannot be 
determined intelligently merely by deductions made and 
inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge and 
practical experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life, 
then there is created a necessity for skilled or expert wit-
nesses to be permitted to give opinion testimony (20 Am. 
Jur. § 765). Such testimony should not be admitted un-
less its admission is demanded by the necessity of the indi-
vidual case, but unless the subject of inquiry relates to some 
trade, profession, science, or art, it is within the province 
of the jury to form their own opinion and not of witnesses, 
although experts, to express theirs. The rule is clearly de· 
fined in 20 Am. Jur. § 780: 
"The rule permitting opm10ns of expert wit-
nesses to be given in evidence is chiefly applicable 
to cases in which, from their very nature, the facts 
disconnected from such opinions cannot be clearly 
presented to the jury so as to enable them to pass 
thereon with the requisite knowledge and informed 
judgment. The governing rule deductible from the 
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adjudicated cases seems to be that the subject must 
be one of science or skill, or one of which observa-
tion and experience have given the opportunity and 
means of knowledge which exists in reason rather 
than descriptive facts, and, hence, cannot be intel-
ligently communicated to others not familiar with 
the subject so as to possess themselves of a full 
understanding of it. Expert testimony is admissible 
only where, by reason of peculiar skill and exper-
ience, inferences can be drawn from facts which an 
ordinary untrained mind cannot deduce, or where 
such testimony relates to a subject which is not 
within the average experience and common sense 
of the jury. Expert opinion testimony is never ad-
missible where the subject is one of common knowl-
edge as to which facts can be intelligently described 
to the jury and understood by them, and they can 
form a reasonable opinion for themselves. Further-
more, the facts on which an expert opinion is based 
must permit of reasonably certain deductions as dis-
tinguished from mere conjectures." 
In a manslaughter case, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a highway patrolman could not state his opinion as to 
causation where the facts were neither complicated nor 
technical. State v. Bleazard, ( 1943) 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 
2d 1000. In that case the state called the patrolman to 
identify a map containing measurements and attempting 
to locate the point of impact. On cross examination, he was 
asked by counsel for defendant if, in his opinion, it was 
not possible and probable that the crash of another car 
caused the death of deceased and not the impact with de-
fendant's vehicle. Counsel for the state objected that the 
question was not subject to opinion evidence and the trial 
court sustained the objection. On appeal, the exclusion was 
sustained in the following language: 
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"The facts upon which his opinion would have 
been based were all before the jury. They were 
neither complicated nor technical so as to require 
interpretation by an expert. Under those circum-
stances, a witness may not be permitted to give an 
opinion. It is not the province of a witness to act , 
as a judge or jury, and questions calling for his ; 
opinion should be so framed as to not call upon him 
to determine controverted questions of fact or to 
pass upon the preponderance of testimony." 
The general rule concerning the application and ad- 1 
missibility of expert opinion testimony in point of impact 
cases is stated in 9 C Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Perm. Ed. Sec. 6311 : 
"Normally, expert testimony is inadmissible to 
show how and where an accident took plaice, or the 
position of the automobile." 
The landmark decision to rule that the point of impact 
was not so technical and complicated a subject matter as 
to require opinion evidence in a.ccident cases is Beckman 
v. Schroeder, (1947 Minn.) 28 N. W. 2d 629. The rule es-
tablished in Beckman has found wide support and comment 
in a majority of the states and the Supreme Court of Min· 
nesota has repeatedly reexamined its basis for rejection of 
opinion evidence of this nature. Murphey v. Hennon, (1963 
Minn.) 119 N. W. 2d 489; Carmody v. Aho (1957 Minn.) 
86 N. W. 2d 692. In Beckman, the trial court received the 
opinion testimony of a sheriff and highway patrolman, over 
objection, concerning point of impact. On appeal, the court 
stated, p. 637: 
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"In this case, in determining whether the acci-
dent happened on the other side of the center line, 
the jury was as competent to make the decision as 
an opinion witness. No superior knowledge was re-
quired. The debris was practically all south of the 
center line; the Schroeder car was several feet south 
of the south slab of the pavement when it came to 
rest after the collision; the front of the Hertzgaarde 
car was over the center line into the south lane sev-
eral feet. In our opinion, the jury was as competent 
to determine where this collision took place as the 
experts, and the place where this accident occurred 
is the crucial question in this case. No doubt the 
official position of these experts carried great 
weight with the jury in locating the place of the 
collision in the north lane." 
Murphey v. Hennon, supra, involved two police offi-
cers stating their opinion as to point of impact. The court 
held, p. 493 : 
"* * * It is settled by our decisions that 
the opinion of a police officer as to the point of im-
pact of a collision is not admissible because such 
opinion is usually not based on any special skill, 
learning, or experience but is simply the judgment 
of the officer based on facts or assumptions ord-
inarily possessed by persons of common intelligence. 
The vice of admitting such testimony is that it per-
mits the jury to substitute the opinion of the officer 
for the combined judgment of the jury, to which 
parties are entitled. Even though it may be rather 
common practice for adversaries to agree that such 
opinions be received, especially from experienced 
and dedicated traffic officers, the mischief of hav-
ing the rule conform to the practice is that it en-
courages trial by experts rather than by witnesses, 
* * * Moreover, receiving such opinions fost-
us 
ers the loose practice of receiving (as was done in 
this case) opinions not based wholly upon facts or 
data perceived by, or personally known or made 
known to, the witness at trial, but also upon hear-
say and instinct. We, therefore, hold that it was 
error to receive these opinions * * * " 
Some states have applied slight modification or varia-
tion to the Minnesota rule but with the same result. In 
Thomas v. Dad's Root Beer and Canada Dry Bottling Com-
pany, ( 1960 Oregon) 356 P. 2d 418, 419, the court ~om­
pared opinion evidence on point of impact to its decisions 
rejecting opinion evidence on rate of speed by a person not 
an eyewitness to the accident: 
"* * * one not an eyewitness to an acci-
dent cannot give his opinion of the rate of speed 
based upon physical facts at the scene of the acci-
dent, because the jury is as well able to draw its 
own inferences and form its own opinion from the 
facts presented as is the witness. * * * The 
rule that such testimony is inadmissible is salutary 
and should apply also to testimony from one not an 
eyewitness to the accident concerning the point of 
impact upon the highway." 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of City 
of Milwaukee v. Bub (1962 Wisc.) 118 N. W. 2d 123, 127, 
holds that opinions by one not an eyewitness concerning 
point of impact is a subject matter reserved for physicists 
or engineers and not a police officer: 
"It takes a high degree of training, plus ex· 
perience, to become an expert on the complex prob· 
lem of where an impact occurs in an automobile 
accident. The testimony of police officer Watters 
certainly does not qualify him as an expert witness. 
Although the record discloses that Watters is an 
experienced police officer, that in itself does not 
qualify him as a physicist or engineer and without 
such knowledge his testimony can be given no 
weight as to the point of impact." (See also Stuart 
v. Dotts, et al., (1949 Cal.) 201 P. 2d 820.) 
On the other hand, Mississippi has expressed its re-
pugnance to permitting even a highly trained and exper-
ienced accidentologist to opinionate as to point of impa.ct 
when the drivers of both vehicles suffered amnesia after 
the accident in Hagan Storm Fence Company v. Edwards, 
(1963 Miss.) 148 So. 2d 693, 695: 
"Where the facts can be produced and presented 
to the jury or other trier of facts by direct evidence, 
in such a manner that they can have an adequate 
basis for formulation of their own decision, with-
out extraneous assistance, opinion evidence (such 
as here) should not be admitted. Ordinarily a wit-
ness must confine his testimony to matters within 
his own knowledge." 
Some states have held that when a party seeks to elicit 
opinion evidence in the absence of showing the prerequi-
sites for that expert opinion evidence, i. e., necessity, tech-
nical and complicated subject matter not within the com-
mon knowledge of the jury, impossibility for the jury to 
draw its own inferences, etc., then the party seeking such 
opinion evidence has failed to establish a proper founda-
tion. North Dakota is the leading state to adopt this line 
of reasoning in the case of Fisher v. Zuko (1959 N. D.) 98 
N. W. 2d 895, 900: 
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"The facts and circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence are such that it may be assumed the jury 
was capable of understanding them and arriving at 
its own conclusion as to where the accident hap-
pened without the aid of the opinion of the high-
way patrolman. Where such a situation affirma-
tively appears there is no foundation for the ex-
pression of an opinion by an expert as to point of 
impact. The trial court erred in overruling def en-
dant's objections and denying the motion to strike 
the conclusion of the witness on the ground that it 
was elicited without sufficient foundation." (See 
also Satterland v. Fieber, (1958 N. D.) 91 N. W. 2d 
623; Bischoff v. Koenig, (1959 N. D.) 100 N. W. 
2d 159.) 
Nebraska has also refuted this type of evidence on the basis 
of improper foundation in the cases of Barry v. Dvorak, 
(1964 Neb.) 126 N. W. 2d 226; Danner v. Walters, (1951 
Neb.) 48 N. W. 2d 635. See also Turcotte v. DeWitt, (1954 
Mass.) 124 N. E. 2d 241, 245. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held in the cases of Dickman 
V. Struble, (1957 Ohio) 146 N. E. 2d 636, Roeder v. Fish-
er's Bakery, Inc., (1963 Ohio) 188 N. E. 2d 78, that the 
place of impact of two vehicles is a matter within the ex-
perience, knowledge and comprehension of an average lay-
man or juror and not a matter involving an interpretation 
of scientific or technical knowledge with which the jury 
itself is not supposed to be competent to deal. The court 
stated in Dickman that to permit opinion evidence on such 
a simple question, even though the facts to be given con-
sideration must be complicated, is to open wide the door 
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of speculation by the jury, and to the return of verdicts 
based upon illegitimate considerations. 
Other courts taking a similar view are: Reed v. Hum-
phreys, (1964 Ark.) 373 S. W. 2d 580 (opinion inadmissible 
when facts can be given jury to reach its own conclusion); 
Conway v. Hudspeth, (1958 Ark.) 318 S. W. 2d 137; Waller 
V. Southern California Gas Co., (1959 Cal.) 339 P. 2d 577 
(facts could be shown without opinion on ultimate issue); 
MiUs v. Redwings Carriers, Inc., (1961 Fla.) 127 So. 2d 
453 (expert opinion not requiring scientific skill or knowl-
edge excluded); Whatley V. Henry, (1941 Ga.) 16 S. E. 
2d 214; Presser v. Schull, (1962 Ind.) 181 N. E. 2d 247 
(error to admit opinion when jury could determine based 
upon eyewitness testimony); Turcotte v. De Witt, (1954 
Mass.) 124 N. E. 2d 241 (jury could comprehend facts 
without opinion of officer); Delta Chevrolet Co. V. Waid, 
(1951 Miss.) 51 So. 2d 443 (jury as well qualified as wit-
ness to determine position of vehicle at impact); Duncan 
V. Pinkston, (1960 Mo.) 340 S. W. 2d 753 (not proper sub-
ject matter of expert or opinion evidence); Stillwell v. 
Schmoker, (1963 Neb.) 122 N. W. 2d 538 (all physical 
facts before jury and opinion should have been excluded); 
Biggs v. Gottsch, (1961 Neb.) 112 N. W. 2d 396, (not 
proper subject matter of opinion evidence on cross-exam-
ination); Padget v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co. (1958 
CAlO N. M.) 262 F. 2d 39 (opinion based on skid marks 
error since layman can trace and arrive at conclusion); 
Kelso v. Independent Tank Co., (1960 Okla.) 348 P. 2d 855 
(cause of collision within experience and understanding of 
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ordinary person); Giffin v. Ensign, (1956 CA 3 Pa.) 234 F. 
2d 307 (jury capable of drawing its own conclusion); Jen-
kins V. Hennigan, (1957 Tex.) 298 S. W. 2d 905 (jury was 
as able to trace skid marks as witness); Venable v. Stock-
ner, (1959 Va.) 108 S. E. 2d 380 (opinion based on common 
knowledge inadmissible); Macey v. Billings, (1955 Wyo.) 
289 P. 2d 422 (error when jurors competent to draw their 
own conclusions); Grayson v. Williams, (1958 CA 10 Wyo.) 
256 F. 2d 61 (opinion inadmissable when jury able to draw 
its own conclusion). 
In the final analysis, expert evidence must take the 
form of either of two general classes: (a) The first class 
deals with facts, the existence of which are not within the 
common knowledge and ordinary intelligence of the lay 
person and said facts are peculiarly within the knowledge 
of men whose experience or study enables them to speak 
with authority concerning these facts. If, in this class of 
expert evidence, the jury can form a conclusion or reason· 
able inference after the presentation of the facts by the 
expert, then it is their sole province to do so. (b) The sec-
ond class of expert evidence is that situation wherein the 
conclusion as well as the knowledge of the facts themselves 
depend upon professional or scientific skill not within the 
range of ordinary knowledge. In this second class of cases, 
not only facts but conclusions to which they lead may be 
testified to by experts in opinion form. 
The distinction between these two kinds of testimony 
is apparent. In the one instance the facts are to be stated 
by the expert, and the conclusion is to be drawnJ by the 
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jury; in the other, the expert states the facts and may then 
give his conclusion in the form of an opinion. Dougherty 
v. Millikan (1900 N. Y.) 57 N. E. 757, 759; Presser v. Schull, 
(1962 Ind.) 181 N. E. 2d 247, 251. 
The instant case did not require the necessity of ex-
pert evidence under either of these classes mentioned. The 
facts were simple and uncomplicated. The debris from the 
accident was light (R. 182). The skid marks, which were 
all on the east side of the highway, did not commence until 
some distance after the impact when the Robert's car 
started its side skid (R. 146). The Robert's car rolled 
over after the side skid so that the entire car was damaged. 
The defendant's car had a side scrape (R. 185). Relating 
these facts to the jury did not require any special skill or 
peculiar knowledge. In any event, the jury was as well able 
to reach its own conclusion of reasonable inference from 
the facts presented as was the patrolman. The conclusion 
of the officer was not dependent upon any professional or 
scientific skill for a proper inference. It must follow that 
the admission of the patrolman's opinion was error. 
(2) Assuming the point of impact is a proper subject 
matter for expert opinion evidence, is such an opinion ad-
missible when based upon some source other than compe-
tent facts? 
Some states have held, under certain circumstances, 
that the point of impact or collision in motor vehicle acci-
dent cases may be a proper subject for expert or skilled 
opinion evidence. Where these opinions are based upon the 
expert witness' own knowledge or observations at the acci-
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dent scene as contrasted from opm10ns based upon hyp0• 
thetical questions and assumed facts, the vast majority of 
these courts require that the witness show sufficient facts 
and knowledge thereof to enable him to form an opinion 
entitled to be given weight by the jury. 66 A. L. R. 2d 
1062. As a general rule, the expert witness must first state 
the facts upon which his opinion is predicated before his 
opinion will be admitted. This practice permits the trial 
court to exclude opinions based upon insufficient facts or 
insufficient knowledge of these facts. 
"It is necessary according to the great weight 
of authority, that an expert witness giving an opin· 
ion upon facts of his own knowledge or based upon 
his own observation first testify to the facts upon 
which his opinion is based" 20 Am. Jur. § 794. 
It was held in Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines, 
(1954) 1 Utah 2d 299, 265 P. 2d 1007, 1010: 
"Yet it is obvious that the court and jury must 
be made aware of the facts upon which the expert 
bases his conclusion, otherwise the testimony would 
be of little assistance, and there would be no way of 
testing the validity of his opinions." 
Patrolman Sherwood failed to reveal to the jury any 
competent facts upon which he based his opinion concern-
ing the point of impact. On direct examination, he dis-
cussed the skid marks of the Robert's car, but testified the 
skid occurred some distance after impact and on the right 
or east side of the highway (R. 177-178); he discussed 
the roll over of the Robert's car, but testified it ended up 
with the entire vehicle on the east or right hand side of the 
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center line (R. 179); and he concluded his testimony by ad-
mitting there were no objective signs whatsoever to de-
termine the point of collision (R. 181). On cross examina-
tion, he discussed light debris on the road, but did not 
identify its location, (R. 182) and he then gave his objec-
tionable opinion as to the point of impact. Certainly those 
facts alone constituted little basis for an opinion as to the 
point of impact, and if anything, more pointedly inferred 
that the impact occurred in the east portion of the high-
way. Thus, the patrolman must have derived his opinion 
from some source other than competent facts, such as hear-
say, speculation, or conjecture. 
In a number of cases where it appeared that the wit-
ness' opinion as to the point of impact was based in part, 
at least, upon what others had told him, and not entirely 
from his own investigation of the accident scene, it has 
been held that the witness' opinion was inadmissible. 
Thus, in Jackson v. Brown, (1961 Okla.) 361 P. 2d 
270, the court held that the opinion must be derived solely 
from an examination of physical evidence found at the 
scene, and in Ward v. Brown, (1962 C. A. 10 Okla.) 301 
F. 2d 445, the court held that an opinion by an officer 
based in part upon statements made by the drivers was 
hearsay. 
"What the two drivers told him was hearsay 
and could not be a proper foundation for opinion 
evidence by an expert. Neither were the remaining 
physical facts on which he based his opinion such 
as to entitle him to give an expert's opinion as to 
where the collision occurred." 
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California has repeatedly refused to admit opinions as 
to the point of impact in accident cases where the opinions 
were based in part upon statements made by others. In 
Francis v. Sauve, (1963 Cal.) 34 Cal. Rptr. 754, 760, the 
court held: 
"However, his op1mon as to the point of im-
pact is not admissible when it is based on what 
witnesses told him rather than what he himself ob-
served." See also Kalfus v. Fraze, (1955 Cal.) 288 
P. 2d 967; Robinson v. Cable, (1961 Cal.) 359 P. 
2d 929; Brooks v. Gilbert, (1959 Iowa) 98 N. W. 
2d 309. 
Those courts that hold the point of impact to be a 
proper subject for expert opinion evidence require a care-
ful review of the sufficiency of the facts in evidence be· 
fore the opinion is admitted, to insure that the facts sup· 
port a rational and intelligent opinion. In Hodges v. Sev-
erns, (1962 Cal.) 20 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134, the court stated: 
"His fixing of the point of impact was not com-
petently done. He relied upon three elements, -
debris on the street, skid marks and statements of 
'both parties involved' which would mean Hill and 
Hislar, who were the drivers involved in the acci· 
dent. Debris alone cannot fix the point of impact. 
(Waller v. Southern California Gas Company, supra, 
339 P. 2d 577.) The skid mark could not suffice 
for the officer testified that he could not say 
whether it was in lane 2 or not, and did not state 
that it began four feet north of the south curb; he 
had no recollection of having measured the skid 
marks. Statements made by Hislar at some subse· 
quent time (and probably to another investigating 
officer) were pure hearsay and could not enter in· 
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to an admissible opinion as to where the impact oc-
curred." 
In the case of Gilbert v. Quintet, (1962 Ariz.) 369 P. 
2d 267, 268, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that skid 
marks and dust marks on the bumper of one of the ve-
hicles were not competent facts for a police officer to base 
his opinion concerning the point of impact. 
"An expert may be allowed, in cases where an 
expert opinion is appropriate, to interpret facts in 
evidence which the jury are not qualified to inter-
pret for themselves. * * * He may base such 
an opinion either on his personal observations given 
into evidence, * * * or upon assumption that 
some portion of the testimony of others already in 
evidence is true. * * * He must however, base 
his opinion only upon competent evidence. * * * 
The officer admitted that he could not form an opin-
ion as to the impact point solely from the skid marks 
and dust marks on the bumper of the bus, nor could 
such an opinion be admitted where there are insuf-
ficient facts in evidence to support a rational and 
intelligent opinion." 
Similarly, in Fryda v. Vesely, (1963 S. D.) 123 N. W. 
2d 345, 348, the court held that the police officer did not 
have sufficient knowledge of facts to enable him to form 
an opinion. 
"Other than stating that he saw some tractor-
tire marks at the accident scene he did not describe 
any other physical facts that he observed pertinent 
to the point of impact. Even if opinion evidence as 
to the point of impact were proper, it is not shown 
that 'the witness has sufficient knowledge of facts 
to enable him to form an opinion entitled to be given 
weight by the jury.' 66 A. L. R. 2d 1062.'' 
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Also, the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to per-
mit the opinion of an expert based upon the position of a 
guardpost, the length of the truck, gauge marks on the 
highway and an examination of the vehicles, in the case 
of Little v. George Feed and Supply Company, (1961 Ark.) 
342 S. W. 2d 668, 672, holding these facts insufficient to 
support an opinion. 
"We do not unequivocally hold 'reconstruction' 
of an aocident by an expert to be inadmissible when 
supported by proper evidentiary facts, but we do 
say that the evidence in this case, upon which Sny-
der's opinion was predicated, was inadequate to 
support his conclusions." 
In jurisdictions that permit expert opinion evidence as 
to point of impact, the sufficiency of the facts upon which 
the opinion is predicated may be a variable factor for each 
case under consideration. But in no event should the court 
accept an opinion in the total absence of competent facts 
upon which the opinion is based. It is submitted that pa-
trolman Sherwood did not reveal to the court or jury any 
competent facts whieh would enable him to form an opin-
ion as to the point of impact, and there were no facts to 
corroborate the opinion given. 
Disregarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses as to 
where the impact occurred, a reconstruction of the acci-
dent scene would reveal that all of the activity and conjes· 
tion immediately prior to the accident took place in the 
west lane of traffic. The Naismith car was on the west 
shoulder of the highway a few feet onto the hard surface 
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(R. 344). There were other cars parked on the west side 
of the highway south of the Naismith's car (R. 185, 204) 
with people standing by their vehicles (R. 186). Clothing 
from the Naismith car was stacked in a pile on the west 
shoulder just south of the Naismith vehicle (R. 191). Pa-
trolman Sherwood's car was parked on the east side but 
completely off the road (R. 140). Some glass remained in 
the west lane of traffic from the first accident (R. 341, 
345, 224). Patrolman Sherwood was standing on the hard 
surface of the road in the west lane of traffic (R. 177, 182) 
about 10 feet from the center of the road (R. 179) talking 
to Mrs. Naismith (R. 176). Mrs. Naismith was standing 
right behind her car (south) on the west side of the road 
(R. 211). Mr. Naismith was standing in front of his car 
on the west side of the road (R. 199). Mr. Brown was 
Rtanding just off the highway to the west by the debris ad-
jacent to the Naismith car (R. 318). Henry Kelly was 
standing in the west lane of traffice 6 to 8 feet from the 
center of the highway (R. 337) and his son was on the west 
side of the road (R. 381, 385) about 200 feet north of the 
Naismith vehicle (R. 379, 386). The accident occurred just 
south of the Naismith car (R. 204, 346). 
Experience would indicate that a driver (Mitchell) 
proceeding south in such a congested lane of traffic would 
normally and naturally turn to the east out and around the 
congested area. Likewise, the northbound driver (Roberts), 
with the oncoming vehicle and the people and cars along 
the west side of the road clearly in his line of vision, would 
hardly be likely to drive into or toward those objects. 
80 
The opinion expressed by the officer did not lend itself 
to the fads nor to common experience of the normal and 
reasonable reaction of drivers under those conditions. The 
patrolman arbitrarily decided to judge for the jury where 
the point of impact occurred when he said : 
"Q. It could have been on the center line. Is 
that correct?" 
"A. Could have been, but it was over the cen" 
ter line" (R. 189). 
The motive for such an opinion was revealed by pa-
trolman Sherwood when he acknowledged that he knew Mr. 
Mitchell prior to the accident, (R. 189) and the admission 
of the patrolman's opinion .constituted error. 
( 3) Assuming the point of impact is a proper subject 
matter for expert opinion evidence, was it error for the 
court to admit in evidence the opinion of patrolman Sher· 
wood after excluding the opinion of Sheriff Jackson? 
It should be noted that the court refused to permit 
plaintiff's first witness, Sheriff Jackson, to give his "opin· 
ion", (R. 43) but, thereafter, permitted patrolman Sher· 
wood to give his "judgment" on cross examination by 
counsel for defendant, as to the point of impact in spite 
of the fact that the patrolman did not see the collision (R. 
75) and found no objective sign whatsoever to determine 
the point of impact (R. 68). 
In McNabb v. Jeppson, (1960 Minn.) 102 N. W. 2d 
709, defense counsel similarly elicited opinion evidence from 
a police officer on cross examination. In that ease plaintiff 
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called a highway patrolman to testify concerning measure-
ments and distances and defendant on cross examination 
asked the patrolman's opinion as to point of impact. Plain-
tiff failed to make a proper objection and the opinion testi-
mony was admitted. Thereafter, plaintiff called an expert 
engineer to rebut the officer's opinion evidence as to point 
of impact and the court on defendant's objection excluded 
this evidence. In reversing, the court held that the case 
did not constitute a proper case for expert testimony as 
to point of impact but that plaintiff failed to make proper 
objection thereby giving the officer's testimony probative 
effect. Therefore, the court held that the opinion evidence 
of the engineer, while normally inadmissible, should have 
been admitted in rebuttal. 
"Generally, where a party elicits evidence, he 
cannot thereafter be heard to say that such evidence 
is not admissible, and where he offers evidence that 
certain conditions exist, he cannot complain that 
the court permits his evidence to be rebutted. * * * 
It is immaterial that the initial inadmissible evi-
dence is brought out on cross examination. * * * 
We believe that in the situation here where inad-
missible opinion testimony is in evidence and must 
be given probative force by the jury, it constitutes 
prejudicial error to exclude testimony of a similar 
character introduced by the party who is adversely 
affected by such testimony." 
Conversely, where a sheriff's opinion testimony is ex-
cluded by the court and not given probative force by the 
jury, it should constitute prejudicial error to admit testi-
mony of a similar character given by a highway patrol-
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man, introduced by the party who objected to the previous 
opinion testimony. 
( 4) If the admission of the highway patrolman's 
opinion was error, was such error prejudicial? 
After culmination of the trial, the jury was asked to 
find whether defendant was negligent by driving left of 
the center of the highway under special verdict 1 (b). This 
was the issue upon which the case turned. After 8 hours 
of deliberation six of the jurors found "No preponderance 
of the evidence." The opinion of the highway patrolman 
upon this subject, given as a witness occupying an official 
position, must have greatly impressed the jury in its find-
ing, particularly since the average layman undoubtedly 
would be inclined to place great weight upon testimony by 
a highway patrolman. The test to be applied in determin-
ing the prejudicial effect of the erroneous testimony is 
stated in Joseph v. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 
(1957) 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330, 333. 
"if, * * * the error appears to be of such 
a nature that it can be said with assurance that it 
was of no material consequence in its effect upon 
the trial because reasonable minds would have ar-
rived at the same results, regardless of such error, 
it would be harmless and the granting of a new 
trial would not be warranted. On the other hand, 
if it appears to be of sufficient moment that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such 
error a different result would have eventuated, the 
error should be regarded as prejudicial and relief 
should be granted." 
The prejudicial effect of erroneously permitting an 
officer to give his opinion as to the point of impact in an 
accident case was discussed in Padgett v. Buxton-Smith 
Mercantile Company, (1958 CA 10 N. M.) 262 F. 2d 39, 
42. Thete, the court found that skid marks, debris and 
damage marks on the vehicles did not require scientific 
skill or know ledge for an expressed opinion as to the point 
of impact and such an opinion thereon was as much within 
the knowledge and competence of a lay juror as a highway 
patrolman. The court held the error was prejudicial in the 
following language : 
"* * * While we are loathe to interfere 
with the broad discretion of the trial courts in mat-
ters of this kind, the opinion came from an officer 
of the law whose badge of authority gave it eviden-
tial significance which may not be dismissed as 
harmless or non prejudicial. As an official opinion 
of a fact matter within the knowledge or compre-
hension of members of the jury it carries a weight 
which tends to usurp the judicial function. It is 
indicative, we think, of what appears to be a con-
stantly growing tendency in cases of this kind for 
an investigating officer to assume the prerogative 
of assessing liability. This is the responsibility of 
the trier of the facts." 
Other courts have expressed themselves in a similar 
language. In Carmody v. Aho, supra, the court said: 
"In a case such as this is, the impact of such 
testimony upon the jury easily can be a determin-
ing factor. We think that it was prejudicial error 
to admit it." 
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Also in Presser v. Schull, (1962 Ind.), supra, the court 
held: 
"The very fact that the court permitted officer 
Jarrett to express his opinion gave weight to his 
testimony tending to cause the jury to substitute 
the opinion of the investigator for the opinion of 
the jury." (See also Maben v. Lee, (1953 Okla.) 
260 P. 2d 1064, 1067; Kelso v. Independent Tank 
Company, (1960 Okla.) 348 P. 2d 855, 858; Ches-
ter v. Shockley, ( 1957 Mo.) 304 S. W. 2d 831; Beck. 
man v. Schroeder, supra; Fisher v. Zuko, supra; 
Jackson v. Brown, supra; Hadley, et al. v. Ross, 
(1944 Okla.) 154 P. 2d 939.) 
In the case of McNelley v. Smith, (1962 Colo.) 368 P. 
2d 555, 558, the court discussed the prejudicial effect of 
erroneously permitting an officer to give his opinion as to 
how plaintiff got into the south bound lane of traffic. 
"The officer's testimony placed the stamp of 
authenticity upon Schaefer's testimony and by impli-
cation branded the McNelley testimony as false. 
Under these circumstances it was error to permit 
the officer to express his opinion * * * " 
It can be said with reasonable assurance that patrol-
man Sherwood's opinion was of material consequence in 
the outcome of the trial. The effect of admitting his testi-
mony after excluding Sheriff Jackson's opinion was to in-
dicate to the jury court approval of the patrolman's opin-
ion and thereby cause the jury to give greater weight to his 
testimony. By implication it tended to brand the testimony 
of plaintiff's four eyewitnesses as false, and created ser-
ious and sober confusion in the minds of the jury as to 
which vehicle had crossed the center line. As an official 
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opinion of a fact matter, it carried a weight which could 
easily have been the determining factor in the trial. There-
fore, the error should be regarded as prejudicial and a new 
trial granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury found that plaintiff had been damaged in 
excess of $66,000.00 as a result of the injuries she received 
from the accident. After an exhaustive eight hours of de-
liberation in an attempt to determine which vehicle had 
crossed the center line of the highway, six members of the 
jury were unable to conclusively return a finding on this 
question and answered the special verdict "no preponder-
ance". Two of the jurors agreed with plaintiff's version. 
The point of impact was not a proper subject matter for 
expert opinion evidence nor were there competent facts in 
evidence upon which such an opinion might be based. In 
any event, it would seem that fair play would not permit 
the patrolman to give unfavorable opinion evidence while 
not allowing favorable evidence of the same nature to be 
given by the sheriff. Plaintiff should not be governed by 
one set of rules and defendant by another. 
Plaintiff, therefore, earnestly submits that the judg-
ment of the lower court should be reversed and plaintiff, 
in the furtherance of justice, should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY, 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appell,ant. 
